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ry I am going to make an admission in beginning mycomments: that Gordon Clark’s article is outside of
my normal field of expertise. I do economic geogra-
phy, in a more conventional sense, and I do not have,
as perhaps Clark might say, a high level of “financial
literacy.” And I personally have not done much
research on finance or capital markets or on social
insurance schemes and on the welfare state in
general. So that is the caveat.
I also had to struggle with the organization and
style of the article. The article is set up as a set of
Russian dolls: arguments within arguments within
arguments. It took me a long time to realize that its
principal object is to critique global movements
toward financial literacy, testing, and education.
Gordon Clark says that societies are pushing finan-
cial literacy as a way of enabling their citizens to
cope with a world of woefully growing financial
complexity and risk. These citizens are faced with a
decline in the ability of social protection systems to
assure them long-term security, something which
was promised to them with the rise of strong
welfare states in the middle of the 20th century.
Since Clark’s was the Roepke Lecture in Economic
Geography, I expected the article to analyze the
geographic differentiation of financial risk, geo-
graphic differentiation in levels of financial literacy,
and geographic variations in financial reasoning.
But geographic differentiation is marginal as a
concern of the article.
The main concern of the article is to critique the
financial literacy movement and its theoretical justi-
fications. The principal justification that Clark takes
aim at is behavioral economics. Clark admits that
behavioral economists have taken on the economics
and financial establishment for their model of univer-
sal rationality. So why does he not like behavioral
economics? Behavioral economists argue that the
model of rationality is flawed because it ignores the
ways in which people make decisions in real con-
texts. Similarly, geographers have long been inter-
ested in contexts that are environmentally, humanly,
and socially constructed. Thus, it may seem that
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behavioral economists and geographers would both be on the side of critiquing the notion
of a single universal rationality.
Instead, Clark claims that the behavioral economists have merely invented yet another
newfangled version of formalism and that the particular brand of contextualism that lies
at the heart of behavioral economics—because it is formalized and its insights are said
to be universal—is just the wolf of universal rationality in the sheep’s clothing of context
and difference. So Clark wants to construct a radical critique of behavioral economics.
Along these lines, Clark objects to some of the key claims of behavioral economists.
Let us consider one known as the “money illusion.” The money illusion concept emerged
from powerful experimental results that show that people attach value to the index
number of how much money they have and systematically do not discount for inflation,
deal with opportunity costs, or consider alternative investments. Yet, according to Clark,
the money illusion is not universal. The extent to which the illusion is understood or
stronger or weaker depends on people’s particular circumstances, institutionally, eco-
nomically, or geographically. This is, as I noted earlier, a radical claim. One would like
to have seen cases and statistics to demonstrate its veracity.
Let us return to the central concern of the article: the financial literacy movement.
Clark argues that the movement is unlikely to help people to pursue their goals in a world
of complex financial markets, and this critique is plausible. It is absurd to think that
ordinary people, even reasonably well-educated ordinary people, can use financial man-
agement courses to plan their financial lives so as to achieve the level of risk they desire.
Even the great supposed geniuses of the finance world failed miserably to manage risk in
2007 and 2008.
In discussing these issues, I expected the article to draw on the distinction first made
by Frank Knight in 1921 in his book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Risk exists as a set of
fluctuations for which we can make a meaningful probability estimate; by contrast,
uncertainty exists when no such effective probability estimates can be made. This
distinction has been the basis of models of financial market fluctuation since the 1930s.
The latest generation of such models, such as Black-Scholes, claimed to have overcome
uncertainty for a wide range new types of investments and financial market interactions,
claiming to have tamed their uncertainty and thereby transforming it into manageable
risk. But as we learned in 2007, they were wrong. That’s how Lehman Brothers and AIG
went down. The system is fundamentally uncertain, as Alan Greenspan admitted
publically, with great pathos, in Congressional testimony after the crisis hit. He admitted
that that the “rational markets hypothesis” was fundamentally flawed.
Since then, we have learned that the problem is not just about the theory of uncertainty.
It is also institutional. Many of the big financial institutions have a reason for not being
overly interested in whether the system is protected from true uncertainty; when they
make mistakes that are really huge, taxpayers will save them. Even today, without having
fully recovered from the terrible recession caused by the financial crash, our financial
markets are overheating again, and as of today, there are six bills in Congress to eliminate
the restrictions that we put on derivatives just two years ago. The Securities and
Exchange Commission, under a Democratic president, supports allowing foreign juris-
dictions to determine the level at which derivatives will be regulated, effectively encour-
aging a new wave of geographic regulatory arbitrage.
So if the great financial powers believe that it does not matter whether they fail or not
and that the system will be saved by public policy, what about ordinary people? They will
not be saved, of course. The underwater homeowners, as well as the tens of millions of
people who lost their jobs and the many millions who depleted their life savings and
whose retirement funds declined precipitously in value, were not saved. No amount of
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financial literacy will help them because, as I noted earlier, even the experts are not
“literate.” The system is now engineered to be so opaque that its various elements cannot
be understood. It is a breeding ground for new “black swans.”
Clark seems to agree with this point of view, but then the article takes a curious twist.
It cites at length the example of Revolution Foods in Oakland, California, where, Clark
says, employees are given practical and easy-to-understand savings and investment
options, which help them plan for their futures. These indeed do seem like sensible and
progressive company policies. But are they going to protect people from financial
collapse in the face of the system dynamics I just mentioned? Obviously not. What would
save me, for example, if the real estate market crashed again and this time it crashed
really hard? Many of our personal assets are in our homes. Or what if there were to be
rampant inflation? What would happen to me, or my retirement fund, if the stock market
crashed again and the Federal Reserve no longer had enough market credibility or funds
to sustain another 10 years of quantitative easing? In this light, the overall recommen-
dation of Clark’s article, which is to reaffirm certain kinds of social insurance regimes,
would not save us. Many pension funds in places like the United States are essentially
large stock funds. That is the University of California retirement system on which my
future will ultimately depend. So financial literacy, sensible company policies, and social
insurance are all probably good things. But without public policy to reshape the world of
finance so that its products are risk-based and not creators of huge quantities of funda-
mental uncertainty, no amount of financial literacy education will suffice to protect
people. Somehow, in the Russian dolls of the article, I think Clark would agree with this
point, but it is a bit hard to tease it out.
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